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LATIMORE v. CITIBANK FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK
151 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 1998)
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Helen Latimore owned a home in a
predominately black neighborhood in
Chicago, Illinois.' She applied to Citibank
Federal Savings Bank ("Citibank") for a
$51,000 loan using her home as collateral.2
Citibank required that two conditions be met
to receive a loan: creditworthiness, and that
the collateral value be at least 75% of the
amount of the loan. Latimore received an
appraisal on the house a year earlier for
$82,000, that would qualify her for a $61,500
loan. Citibank did not know of the first
appraisal when it initially denied the loan.4
Citibank's appraiser, Ed Kembauer, however,
valued the home at $45,000.5 Kernbauer's
appraisal made the requested $51,000 loan
113% of the collateral.
When Citibank denied Latimore's
application for a loan, Latimore informed
Citibank of the initial appraisal for $82,000. 7
' Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Say. Bank, 151 F.3d 712,
713 (7th Cir. 1998).
31d.
I Id. Using Citibank's formula that the amount of the
loan not exceed 75 percent of the collateral's value, if
the appraiser estimates the value of the house at
$82,000, Citibank would multiply that amount by 0.75
to find 75 percent of the collateral's value. The
resulting amount, $61,500, is 75 percent of $82,000.
51d.
6 Id. Using the reverse of the previous formula,
dividing the requested loan amount, $51,000, by
Citibank's collateral appraisal, $45,000, one gets 1.13.
To give Latimore the loan amount she requested,
Citibank would have to grant a loan 113 percent the
value of the collateral. In order to meet Citibank's 75
percent requirement, Latimore's home needed to have
been appraised at or above $68,000 ($51,000 divided
by 0.75).
71d.
A Citibank official forwarded the first
appraisal and Kembauer's appraisal to
Citibank's review department.' The review
department discredited the first appraisal on
grounds it lacked a proper basis for
comparison because the first appraiser used a
method the Citibank appraisers rejected in
comparing neighborhood home sales.9
Citibank did not overrule their appraiser,
Kembauer, and subsequently denied the loan
application. i
Following Citibank's rejection,
Latimore applied for a loan with another
bank." The new bank's appraiser valued
Latimore's home at $79,000.2 Based on the
new estimate, Latimore qualified for a loan of
$46,000 at a higher interest rate at the second
bank.
13
Latimore brought suit against Citibank
and several Citibank officials in federal
district court alleging racial discrimination in
real estate lending.14 She alleged that the
defendants violated the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act ("ECOA")"5 and the Fair
Housing Act ("FHA"). 16 The district court
granted summary judgment to the defendants
because Latimore failed to make a prima facie
showing of credit discrimination. 7  The
district court ruled that plaintiffs "must show
that 'race was a motivating consideration in








15 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (1998).
16 42 U.S.C. §§ 3605(a), (b) (1998).
17 Latimore, 151 F.3d at 713.
loan" in actions arising under the ECOA or
FHA.18
HOLDING
To the extent courts have extended the
McDonnell Douglas v. Green'9 standard to
various kinds of discrimination20 under the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA") and
the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), the court
refused to extend it to cases of discrimination
in lending.2' The plaintiff may "try to show in
a conventional way, without relying on any
special doctrines of burden-shifting, that there
is enough evidence, direct or circumstantial,
of discrimination to create a triable issue."
22
The plaintiff failed to meet this burden and the
district court's grant of summary judgment for
defendants was affirmed.23
IS Latimore v. Citibank, F.S.B., 979 F. Supp. 662, 664
(N.D. Ill. 1997) (citing Thomas v. First Fed. Say. Bank,
653 F. Supp. 1330, 1338-39 (N.D. Ind. 1987)).
9 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). A plaintiff may plead discrimination and
survive summary judgment either by showing evidence
of discrimination, or using the McDonnell Douglas
standard. McDonnellDouglas involved discrimination
in employment, and the court required a plaintiff to
show: "(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that
he applied and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his
rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of [his]
qualifications." Id. at 802. Then the burden shifts to
the defendant to come forward with "some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's
rejection." Id.
20 The McDonnell Douglas standard was extended to
age discrimination in employment in Coco v. Elmwood
Care, Inc., 128 F.3d 1177 (7th Cir. 1997).
21 Latimore, 151 F.3d at 715.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 716.
ANALYSIS
In McDonnell Douglas24 the United
States Supreme Court established the test for
a prima facie case of racial discrimination.
25
A plaintiff must show "(i) that he belongs to a
racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for ajob for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that,
after his rejection, the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants
from persons of complainant's
qualifications. " 26  When the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case, the burden then
shifts to the defendant to show a
nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiffs
rejection.27
The Court in McDonnell Douglas
looked specifically at racial discrimination in
employment hiring.28  The defendant
(McDonnell Douglas Corporation) laid off the
plaintiff in a "general reduction in work
force."2 9 Later, when the defendant advertised
open employment positions, plaintiff applied
and was rejected.30 The Supreme Court found
that the plaintiff established a prima facie case
and allowed the discrimination suit to
continue.3'
In Latimore, Latimore attempted to
use the McDonnell Douglas standard to shift
the burden to defendants to prove there was no
ill intent.32 The theory is that the defendant is
more likely to have evidence to rebut
discrimination than the plaintiffwould have to
24 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
25 Id. at 802.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 793-96.
29 Id. at 794.
30 Id. at 796.
31 Id. at 807.
32 Latimore, 151 F.3d at 712.
prove discrimination.33 "[E]ssential evidence
is in the defendant's possession and [it] would
be difficult for the plaintiff, even with the aid
of modem pretrial discovery, to dig [the
evidence] out of the defendant."3 Ifplaintiffs
lacked this burden shifting, it would be very
difficult for them to prove discrimination
because they would not have the necessary
information to prove intent. But the court of
appeals would not allow the burden shifting
because this situation does not parallel
McDonnell Douglas.35
In the credit lending situation, an
applicant does not usually directly compete
with other applicants for loans. "Latimore
was not competing with a white person for a
$51,000 loan."36  The Latimore court
distinguishes McDonnell Douglas because
with the facts in Latimore the plaintiff cannot
show disparate treatment of similarly situated
persons and thus never met the standard.37
However, the court does allow for an
opportunity for plaintiffs to shift the burden if
the bank proposes a competitive situation.38 If
a bank did provide a competitive setting for
granting loans, for example if the bank stated
that a $51,000 loan would be available on a
certain date and one applicant would be
chosen in an open application process, courts
could then apply the McDonnell Douglas
standard because there is a "basis for
comparing the defendant's treatment of the
plaintiff with the defendant's treatment of
other, similarly situated persons."39  But
because Latimore failed to show more than a
mere suspicion of racial discrimination, the










judgment. "No reasonable suspicion of racial
discrimination can arise from the mere fact of
a discrepancy between an appraisal conducted
by another bank and the appraisal made by
Citibank's employee. "40 Plaintiffmust show a
comparison "between the treatment of blacks
and the treatment of whites.
41
The standard of a mere suspicion,
however, opens up the possibility that
Latimore could have survived the summary
judgment motion if she had shown more than
a mere suspicion. Plaintiffs need to
demonstrate "enough evidence, direct or
circumstantial, of discrimination to create a
triable issue."'42 Latimore attempted to create
a triable issue by comparing several appraisals
of her house's value.43 The court found the
differences in appraisals only showed that
appraisers differ: "[r]eal estate appraisal is not
an exact science,... the fact that Citibank's
appraisal was lower than someone else's does
not create an inference of discrimination."'
Further, Latimore argues that Citibank
discriminated by giving white applicants extra
consideration by "help[ing] them raise the
appraised value of their property. ... 
However, the court found that a Citibank
official did help Latimore try to raise the value
of the appraisal so that the loan would be
approved.46 The official urged Latimore to
participate in the review process and submit
the earlier, higher appraisal so that Citibank's
appraisal review department could investigate
and possibly overrule the appraiser's
estimate.47 Latimore was unable to show that
40 Id. at 715.
41 Id.
42 Id. (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston,




46 Id. at 716.
47 Id.
bank officials did anything more for white
applicants, or any less for her to raise the
appraisal value.
Finally the court noted that Citibank's
appraiser lost his notes.48 The government
requires banks to keep these records for at
least twenty-five months after a loan denial.49
Courts presume that missing evidence
contained information adverse to the
violator." The Court, however, accepts
Citibank's incontroverted explanation that it
lost the notes inadvertently, and thus rejects a
presumption of ill intent. 1
CONCLUSION
Latimore signals the Seventh Circuit's
reluctance to extend the McDonnell Douglas
standard to cases of discrimination where
there is no direct comparison of applicants
available. In the credit lending situation,
plaintiffs must show disparate treatment to use
the burden shifting techniques of the
McDonnell Douglas standard.
At the district court level, Latimore
relied heavily on the holding in Old West End
Association v. Buckeye Federal Savings &
Loan,52 an Ohio case. Latimore argued that
under the standard in Old West End, a plaintiff
had established a prima facie case by
"showing that (1) the property was in a
minority neighborhood, (2) an application for
a loan secured by this property was made, (3)
an independent appraisal concluded that the
value of the property was sufficient to secure
the loan, (4) the applicant was otherwise credit
[sic] worthy, and (5) the loan application was
rejected."53  Using this standard, Latimore
would have proven a reasonable suspicion of
discrimination and been able to survive
summary judgment.
The district court, however, did not
follow the Ohio case because this prima facie
analysis has been applied only in the Northern
District of Ohio and because of factual
differences in the two cases. 4 In affirming the
district court, the Seventh Circuit, refused to
apply the Ohio analysis in credit lending. 55
Under the district court's analysis, if the facts
were similar enough, the Old West End test
could have been applied. 56 Therefore, the
court did not foreclose use of the Old West
End test. Further, the appellate court did not
expressly criticize the Ohio court's analysis.
While the district court opinion cited the Ohio
cases and acknowledged their precedent
without applying it in this instance,57 the
appellate court did not mention the Ohio
holdings either to say that analysis should not
apply here because of factual differences, or
because of general problems with the
extension of the McDonnellDouglas standard
without a direct competitor.
While the Latimore court
acknowledged that two circuits have looked
into extending the McDonnell Douglas
standard to instances of credit lending, neither
of those circuits has fully accepted extension.
In Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank,58 the Fifth
Circuit held that the denied applicant would
not be able to recover because he did not show
discrimination. 9 The applicant's case failed
48 Id.
49 12 C.F.R. § 202.12(b)(1)(i).
" Latimore, 151 F.3d at 716. See, e.g., Hicks v. Gates
Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1418-19 (10th Cir. 1987);
Favors v. Fisher, 13 F.3d 1235, 1239 (8th Cir. 1994).
5t Latimore, 151 F.3d at 716.
52 Latimore, 979 F. Supp. at 666-67 (citing Old West
End Ass'n v. Buckeye Fed. Sav. & Loan, . 675 F.
Supp. 1100 (N.D. Ohio 1987)).
53 Latimore, 979 F. Supp. at 666-67.
54 Id. at 667.
55 Latimore, 151 F.3d at 714-15.
56 See Latimore, 979 F. Supp. at 667.
57 Id. at 666-67.
58 83 F.3d 1546 (5th Cir. 1996).
59 Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546 (5th Cir.
1996). In this case, the defendant bank denied a loan
because "[Simms] presented absolutely no
evidence that other, 'non-protected' applicants
or applications were treated any differently
around the time of [Simms'] rejection."60
While the Fifth Circuit does not expressly
reject the McDonnell Douglas standard in
credit lending cases, it does not freely allow
application of the standard without any
comparison situation.6 The court expressly
rejected Simms' theory that the burden shifted
to the defendants to prove non-discriminatory
effect.62 "The ultimate burden of persuasion
that race was an intentional and significant
factor in rejecting Simms' proposal was
squarely on Simnms."'63
The Latimore court also discussed
Ringv. First Interstate Mortgage, Inc. 4 where
the Eighth Circuit held the McDonnell
Douglas standard would apply to cases under
the FHA.65 However, the Eighth Circuit also
discussed the specific evidentiary standard
needed to apply the burden shifting.66 "[T]he
prima facie case under this analysis is an
evidentiary standard -- it defines the quantum
of proof plaintiff must present to create a
rebuttable presumption of discrimination that
to the applicant, Simms, to repair the apartment
building he owned and leased to mainly minorities.
Simms alleged that the minority status of his tenants
and partners caused the bank to deny the loan. The
jury found that Simms had been discriminated against
and that there were discriminatory effects to the loan
denial. See id. at 1554.
60 Id. at 1558.
61 See id.
62 Id. at 1559.
63 Id.
984 F.2d 924 (8th Cir. 1993).
65 Id. at 926. While the court discusses application of
the McDonnell Douglas standard to credit lending
under the FHA, the court declines to use this analysis
because the case appears from dismissal under Rule
12(b). Id. The court will not review a prima facie case
at the pleading stage and thus does not employ the
McDonnell Douglas standard.
66Id.
shifts the burden to defendant to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
its conduct. '67  Thus, the Ring court says
plaintiffs may use the McDonnell Douglas
standard once they have proven a prima facie
case of discrimination.68
While the Latimore court cited to the
Fifth and Eighth Circuits as courts that
employ McDonnell Douglas in extended
situations, the disparity between the circuits is
not great. None of these circuits would allow
a plaintiff to use the McDonnell Douglas
standard without evidence of direct
competition, racial discrimination, or other
impact. While this may not be enough for the
Supreme Court to decide this matter, many
credit discrimination cases arise in the
Seventh (Chicago) and Sixth (Ohio) Circuits.69
If most of these lending discrimination cases
do come from these two circuits that differ on
interpretation, the Supreme Court may want to
rule on the issue.
Future courts should examine the
plaintiffs inherent difficulties in being able to
meet the prima facie standard and the
defendant's need for a concrete standard.
Even here, Citibank wanted the court to apply
the McDonnell Douglas standard.70 If banks
did not discriminate and had evidence to show
that both minority and majority candidates
received the same treatment, courts would
dismiss these cases summarily. Banks would
be forced to tum over documents they already
67Id.
68 Id. at 927.
69 Robert G. Schwemm, Introduction to Mortgage
Lending Discrimination Law, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REv.
317, 332 n.4 (1995). Schwenum postulates that so
many ofthese cases come fromthese two areas because
they both have "[S]ome of the more aggressive private
fair housing organizations in the country, and these
organizations had the interest, resources, and energy to
bring lending discrimination cases when very few other
could do so." Id.
70 Latimore, 151 F.3d at 713.
have -- and that the government requires them
to keep in any case.
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